CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY & TAX
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2010(d) is not an “applicable
bankruptcy law” under the purview of 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) because
the Tennessee statute is specifically aimed at bankruptcy
proceedings. Tennessee v. Hildebrand (In re Corrin), 849 F.3d 653 (6th Cir.
2017).
Elizabeth Holland
In Tennessee v. Hildebrand (In re Corrin), 849 F.3d 653 (6th Cir.
2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed
whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2010(d) is an “applicable
bankruptcy law” under 11 U.S.C. § 511(a). In the courts below, the
debtor, Mildred Bratt (the “Debtor”), and the Chapter 13 Trustee (the
“Trustee”) argued that the Tennessee provision was unconstitutional
and, in any event, did not apply to the Debtor’s plan. The Metropolitan
Government of Nashville (“Metro”) and the State of Tennessee (the
“State”), an intervenor, countered that the provision was constitutional
and was intended to eliminate an unfairness that existed prior to the
statute’s amendment. The courts below and the Sixth Circuit held for
the Debtor, finding that section 67-5-2010(d) does not apply to Chapter
13 plans for payment of delinquent property taxes.
The case arose when the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case in 2014. The Debtor listed a $5,200 oversecured debt owed to
Metro in delinquent property taxes. In her repayment plan, the Debtor
proposed paying 12% interest. The parties confirmed the Debtor’s
Chapter 13 plan, despite Metro’s objections to the interest rate. Metro
argued that, under Tennessee Code section 67-5-2010, the statutorily
appropriate interest rate was 18%, not the proposed 12% interest rate.
Consequently, all parties agreed to reserve any issues related to Metro’s
claim.
In the Bankruptcy Court, the Debtor argued that section 67-52010(d) violates the Supremacy Clause and Equal Protection Clause of
the federal Constitution. In re Bratt (Bratt I), 527 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2015). The Trustee sought to avoid any constitutional
arguments by basing his claim on the applicability of U.S. Code § 511(a)
to the Tennessee Code section at issue. The State and Metro argued that
the Tennessee General Assembly amended section 67-5-2010(d) to
eliminate unfair treatment that resulted from the ruling in In re Gift, 469
1067
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B.R. 800 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2012), superseded by statute, 2014 Tenn. Pub.
Acts ch. 883. The Bankruptcy Court, however, held that section 67-52010(d) is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it
infringes on the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the court determined that the
12% interest proposed by the Debtor was appropriate.
The State and Metro appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“B.A.P.”). In re Bratt (Bratt II), 549 B.R.
462, 464 (BAP 6th Cir. 2016). The B.A.P. declined to address the
constitutional issue that decided the case below. Instead, the panel took
up the Trustee’s argument that Tennessee Code section 67-5-2010(d) is
not an applicable nonbankruptcy law. The B.A.P. held that the
bankruptcy court’s definition of a bankruptcy law—as any law within the
Bankruptcy Code—was too narrow. Thus, the bankruptcy court’s
definition of a nonbankruptcy law—as any law outside of the
Bankruptcy Code—was too broad. Instead, the B.A.P. held that
subsection (d) did not govern the determination of a debtor’s tax interest
rate under U.S. Code § 511(a) because subsection (d) applied only to
bankruptcy cases and was, therefore, a bankruptcy law, despite being
outside the Bankruptcy Code.
U.S. Code section 511(a) gives government authorities leeway in
determining the appropriate amount of interest imposed on tax claims.
This section provides:
If any provision of this title requires the payment of interest on a
tax claim or on an administrative expense tax, or the payment of interest
to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the allowed amount
of a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate determined under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 511(a). In 2012, however, a Tennessee bankruptcy
court held that the same leeway is not allowed in the imposition of
penalties. Gift, 469 B.R. at 812–13. The court in Gift held that while the
Bankruptcy Code allows “oversecured claimholders to tack on interest
and reasonable fees, costs, and charges, . . . it does not allow penalties,
because penalties were not intended by Congress to be part of a
consensual or nonconsensual lienholder’s oversecured post-petition
claim.” Bratt I, 527 B.R. at 305 (citing Gift, 469 B.R. at 813). Shortly
after Gift, the Tennessee legislature amended section 67-5-2010 to
include subsection (d). The statute now provides:
(a)(1) To the amount of tax due and payable, a penalty of onehalf of one percent (0.5%) and interest of one percent (1%) shall be
added on March 1, following the tax due date and on the first day of
each succeeding month.
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...
(d) For purposes of any claim in a bankruptcy proceeding
pertaining to delinquent property taxes, the assessment of penalties
pursuant to this section constitutes the assessment of interest.
Tenn. Code Ann. §67-5-2010. The court’s decision in Tennessee v.
Hildebrand thus depended on the status of subsection (d) as a bankruptcy
law or a nonbankruptcy law.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s
decision in Bratt I, but followed the reasoning of the panel in Bratt II and
declined to address any constitutional issues raised by the case. The
Debtor was deceased by the time of the appeal, and her estate was
represented by Michael Corrin. The court began its analysis by
interpreting the plain meaning of the statute. The court reasoned that
Congress added U.S. Code § 511 to the Bankruptcy Code to simplify the
calculation of interest rates. Furthermore, the court observed that
Congress had thus authorized states to pass laws that were generally
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings, but not specifically targeted at or
limited to such proceedings—hence the phrase “applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”
The court then considered whether subsection (d) is or is not a
nonbankruptcy law. The court disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s
application of In re Fowler, 493 B.R. 148 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012), a case
which led the bankruptcy court to reason that subsection (d) was an
applicable nonbankruptcy law. In Fowler, the California court reasoned
that a clear line should be drawn between bankruptcy law and
nonbankruptcy law. Id. at 155–56. Furthermore, the court in Fowler
found that the former is found only in the Bankruptcy Code, while the
latter is found only outside of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. The Sixth
Circuit, however, observed that if Congress had wanted to draw such a
bright line between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy laws, it would have
clearly provided for that demarcation in the Code. Ultimately, the court
found that Tennessee Code section 67-5-2010(d) is, as a law specifically
targeted at bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy law. Furthermore,
section 67-5-2010(d) is not applicable under U.S. Code § 511(a) to
determine a debtor’s interest rates on overdue property taxes. The
court, therefore, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment approving
the 12% interest rate in the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.
Practitioners should note the outcome of this case because it
followed Gift in limiting the state government’s authority to impose
additional burdens upon debtors. As in Gift, the holding in Hildebrand
prevents a state government from tacking on additional “interest” to a
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debtor’s oversecured property tax claim. In addition, the court made it
clear that not all bankruptcy laws are found in the Bankruptcy Code.
One must examine the law’s purpose and target proceeding, rather than
solely referring to its placement in or outside of the Bankruptcy Code, to
determine whether a court will classify it as a bankruptcy law.

CORPORATE
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a breakdown in
communication between a corporation and its registered agent was not
grounds to set aside a default judgment. Ace Design Grp., Inc. v. Greater
Christ Temple Church, Inc., No. M2016–00089–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 7166408,
at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2016).
Claire Tuley
In Ace Design Group, Inc. v. Greater Christ Temple Church, Inc., No.
M2016–00089–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 7166408, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
8, 2016), defendant Greater Christ Temple Church, Inc. (the “Church”)
appealed a default judgement in favor of plaintiff architecture firm Ace Design
Group, Inc. (“Ace”) in a breach of contract case. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals found that although the default judgement was appropriate, the
damages were vacated because the trial court did not determine whether a valid
contract existed.
Ace and the Church entered into an oral agreement to construct a
sanctuary for the Church in 2013. Ace submitted a written proposal around
July 1, 2013, which included pricing and estimated timeframes for each stage of
the project. On October 30, Ace gave the Church a written agreement that
included terms of completion, compensation, and other matters related to the
construction. The Church did not sign either of the 2013 agreements, but did
pay Ace $25,000 on October 29. The Church did not make any further
payments, and in March of 2015, Ace filed a complaint in the Chancery Court
of Davidson County for breach of contract.
Ace attempted to serve the summons and complaint on Harvey
Hoskins (“Hoskins”) on March 31, 2015. Hoskins was listed as the Church’s
registered agent with the Tennessee Secretary of State. Ace was unable to
locate Hoskins at the address on file, and he was not served until April 22. The
Church did not answer or appear before the Trial Court, and Ace moved for a
default judgement. The Church was served with the motion for default
judgement on June 22 and again failed to answer or appear. The trial court
awarded the default judgement, and a copy was mailed to the Church on
August 7, who did not send a representative to the hearing. The trial court
ordered damages on August 25 and served the judgement on the Church the
same day.
On September 4, the Church filed a motion to vacate the judgement
under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, arguing that the failure to
correctly serve the Church was a mistake that necessitated vacating the
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judgement. The Church filed an affidavit by the Church’s Bishop, stating that
he was unaware of the suit due to service on Hoskins. Hoskins also filed an
affidavit in support of the invalid service of process, although he later
conceded that he was served. On October 16, the Trial Court denied the
Church’s motion after finding that Hoskins willfully failed to notify the Church
of the suit, meaning that the excusable neglect requirement to vacate a
judgement under Rule 60.02 was not met.
Upon the Church’s appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the
appellate court found two dispositive issues to be addressed: whether the trial
court erred in entering the default judgement and whether the trial court erred
in awarding damages to Ace.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the default judgment issue
by reviewing Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(4), which states that
service of process on corporate defendants may be delivered to a registered
agent. Under Tennessee law, corporations are required to maintain agents for
service of process, notice, or demand. Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-15-101(a)(2).
Because the parties did not dispute on appeal that Hoskins was personally
served while acting as the Church’s registered agent, it was proper to serve him
as the Church’s authorized agent. The court found it irrelevant that Ace did
not attempt also to serve the Bishop at the Church’s physical location because
Tennessee law requires service on the authorized agent or a corporate officer,
not both. The appellate court held that the default judgement was valid
because it was undisputed that the Church failed to make any appearances or
responses. The appellate court therefore affirmed the default judgement.
In determining whether the damages were proper, the court relied on
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.03. Under that rule, a party is rendered
the damages to which it “is entitled.” The court found this to mean that a
default judgement did not guarantee damages, but instead awarded only those
that a trial court found to be legally sufficient. For a breach of contract case,
Ace would only be entitled to damages if there was a valid and enforceable
contract. If the trial court found that there was no valid contract, then the
court would determine only quasi-contract damages.
The appellate court found that it was impossible to review the Trial
Court’s decision because the record contained no evidence as to whether the
contract was valid. Furthermore, the appellate court expressed “some
concern” as to whether the prima facie elements for contract formation were
even met in the case, specifically regarding mutual consent and the Statute of
Frauds.
The appellate court acknowledged that the doctrine of partial
performance could apply to the case in the absence of a written and signed
contract. Previous Tennessee cases found that partial performance can excuse
an oral contract from the Statute of Frauds if the plaintiff performed services
and “altered his position in such a way that it would be unjust and
unconscionable not to enforce the contract.”
The appellate court
acknowledged that the Church’s $25,000 payment in October 2013 could
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evidence partial performance, but also noted that the payment was not
contemplated by either of the 2013 agreements. Because the trial court’s
record did not include a factual basis for finding that a valid contract existed,
the appellate court vacated the award of damages and remanded to the trial
court so it could determine whether a contract existed.
Although choosing a registered agent and contract formation appear to
be relatively straightforward topics, this case demonstrates to practicing
attorneys that there are significant consequences for making errors. The
appellate court affirmed the default judgement because it appeared that there
was a breakdown of communication between the Church and Hoskins. The
exact nature of the communication failure is not clear, but in denying the
motion to vacate, the trial court attributed Hoskins’ failure to respond to the
Church. Attorneys help their corporate clients choose a reliable registered
agent. A change in address or agent should always be immediately reported to
the Secretary of State. Had the Church taken these necessary steps, the default
judgement could have been avoided.
Attorneys should also advise clients to put agreements in writing.
Although the Appellate Court acknowledged that there were few facts
regarding the 2013 agreements in the record, if Ace insisted that an agent of the
Church sign those agreements, it is likely that the mutual assent and Statute of
Frauds questions would have been answered in favor of Ace and their award
would have stood. The failure to do so allowed the Church to successfully
challenge the award in spite of its own bad actions. Attorneys should advise
their clients that the best way to protect themselves is to get everything in
writing, no matter how holy the other party may be.

CONTRACTS, LENDING, NOVATION, & DRAFTING
The Sixth Circuit held that whether a novation occurred in an amended
and restated loan agreement is a question of fact for the jury. Bash v.
Textron Fin. Corp. (In re Fair Fin. Co.), 834 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2016).
J. Logan Wilson
On January 7, 2002, Tim Durham and James Cochran purchased the
Debtor, Fair Finance Company, using a loan from Textron Financial
Corporation (“Textron”) and United Bank (“United”). The 2002 Textron and
United Loan and Security Agreement (“2002 L&SA”) provided for an
undiluted security interest in the Debtor, as well as various auditing and
financial reporting requirements. Durham and Cochran then proceeded to use
the Debtor as a front for a classic Ponzi scheme, taking advantage of investors
to grant “loans” to themselves and other insiders. Textron and United made
numerous indications that they were aware of Durham and Cochran’s scheme,
but felt they were protected under the security agreement, so they did nothing.
On January 6, 2004, at the end of the term of the 2002 L&SA, Textron, the
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Debtor, and Fair Holdings, Inc. (“FHI,” Durham and Cochran’s holding
company for the Debtor), entered into a First Amended and Restated Loan and
Security Agreement (the “2004 ARL&SA”), which reduced the amount of
indebtedness, provided for Textron buying out United’s interest in the loan,
incorporated the security interest from the 2002 L&SA, and changed many of
the terms of the 2002 L&SA.
Until their interest was completely paid off and released on July 20,
2007, Textron received over $300 million in payments from the Debtor and
FHI while continuing to make statements over the years indicating their
knowledge of Durham and Cochran’s fraudulent activities. Durham, Cochran,
and the Debtor’s CFO were convicted of wire fraud, securities fraud, and
conspiracy on March 11, 2011. Soon after, the Debtor’s note holders filed a
petition for an involuntary bankruptcy against the Debtor. The Trustee for the
bankruptcy filed several adversary proceedings against Textron and other
creditors in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The
Trustee’s claims against Textron included aiding and abetting claims,
conspiracy claims, claims to avoid and recover actual and constructive
fraudulent transfers, and equitable subordination and disallowance claims. After
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the
Trustee’s and Textron’s motions to transfer the case to district court, the
district court referred the adversary proceeding to the bankruptcy court for
pretrial supervision and a report and recommendation on all dispositive
motions. The bankruptcy court recommended that Textron’s motion to dismiss
be denied in full, holding that the Trustee sufficiently pled each claim and that
Textron’s arguments for dismissal “required the resolution of factual disputes.”
The district court rejected the bankruptcy court’s recommendation and
granted Textron’s motion to dismiss. The district court held that, as a matter of
law, the 2004 ARL&SA was not a novation of the 2002 L&SA, meaning the
security interest granted in the 2002 L&SA continued in full force. Because
Textron had maintained a valid security interest since 2002, neither the 2004
ARL&SA nor the payments under it were transfers under a fraudulent transfer
claim. The court also held that “any post-execution bad faith on the part of
Textron did not render the 2002 security interest invalid for purposes of the
Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims.” 1
The district court also dismissed the Trustee’s aiding and abetting claim, civil
conspiracy claim, and equitable subordination and disallowance claim. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the dismissal of all of these claims. Although the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of
these issues is important, the scope of this case synopsis is limited to the court’s ruling
on the novation issue.

1
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On appeal by the Trustee, the Sixth Circuit held that the Trustee
established an ambiguity as to whether the 2004 ARL&SA constituted a
novation under Ohio law and, as a result, the Trustee sufficiently stated a
plausible claim for actual fraudulent transfer. 2 Under Section 1336.04(A)(1) of
the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), Ohio Rev. Code §
1336.01 et seq., transfers or obligations are fraudulent and avoidable if made
with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 1336.01(H) and (L). Transfers include the creation of a lien,
and liens include security interests created by agreement. Ohio Rev. Code §
1336.01(H) and (L). “[H]owever, the Ohio UFTA explicitly carves out all
‘[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien’ from the statute’s
definition of a transferable asset.” See Ohio Rev. Code § 1336.01(B)(1). Thus,
the Trustee had to show that the Debtor’s assets and interests conveyed by the
2004 ARL&SA were not already encumbered by a valid lien. If the 2004
ARL&SA was a novation, then the security interest under the 2002 L&SA was
extinguished when the novation occurred, and the Trustee could seek
avoidance of the 2004 ARL&SA.
Under Ohio law, a novation occurs when a “previous valid obligation
is extinguished by a valid new contract . . . .” McGlothin v. Huffman, 640 N.E.2d
598, 601 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). There are three elements for a novation: (i)
intent; (ii) knowledge; and (iii) consent. See Nat’l City Bank v. Reat Corp., 580
N.E.2d 1147, 1149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). Knowledge and consent may be
implied from circumstances or conduct, but the evidence must be clear and
definite, since a novation is never presumed. Id.; Bolling v. Clevepak Corp., 484
N.E.2d 1367, 1379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). Ohio law presumes that a new loan is
a renewal instead of a novation, but a party can overcome that presumption by
demonstrating the parties intended the new transaction to discharge the prior
debt and security interest. Noland v. Wilmington Sav. Bank (In re D&K Aviation,
Inc.), 349 B.R. 169, 175–77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).
Several factors contributed to the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the
evidence supported the Trustee’s assertion that the parties “clearly and
overwhelmingly manifested their intent for the 2004 ARL&SA to constitute a
novation of the 2002 L&SA.” The court turned to four provisions in the 2004
ARL&SA. One stated that the parties desired the 2004 ARL&SA to
“supersede[ ] any and all prior oral or written agreements relating to the subject
matter thereof.” The next indicated that the 2004 ARL&SA “constitutes the
entire agreement of Borrowers and Lender relative to the subject matter
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the Trustee’s constructive
fraudulent transfer claim, holding that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

2
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hereof.” The third indicated that “the Debtor and FHI agreed to ‘grant, pledge,
convey and assign’ a new security interest in and lien upon their property to
Textron ‘to secure the prompt and full payment and complete performance of
all obligations of Borrowers to Lender under [the 2004 ARL&SA].’” Finally,
“the parties explicitly confirmed that the 2004 ARL&SA was the product of
‘valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged.’”
The court also held that three factors surrounding the execution of the
2004 ARL&SA indicated the parties’ intent for a novation. First, the parties
entered into the 2004 ARL&SA on the maturity date of the 2002 L&SA.
Second, “the parties replaced the 2002 promissory note and personal
guarantees with a new promissory note and new personal guarantees.” Third,
the court held that “the 2004 ARL&SA imposed significant new terms on both
parties,” listing out several new terms. The court held that these factors and the
four provisions it noted at least demonstrate the existence of an ambiguity as to
whether the parties intended the 2004 ARL&SA to extinguish the 2002 L&SA.
The court also examined a case the district court relied upon heavily in
its order, Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc. v. Citicorp North
America, Inc. (In re TOUSA, Inc.), No. 09–60589, 2011 WL 1627129 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 4, 2011). In In re TOUSA, Inc., the court held that a Second Amended and
Restated Revolving Credit Agreement did not constitute a novation. However,
that agreement contained a provision stating that “it was the ‘intent of the
parties . . . that the security interests and [l]iens granted in the [c]ollateral under
and pursuant to the [o]riginal [s]ecurity [a]greement shall continue in full force
and effect.’” Id. at *1, 7. No such statement existed in the 2004 ARL&SA.
Consequently, the court held that if the 2004 ARL&SA was a novation, then
the payments and security interests under the 2004 ARL&SA constituted a
fraudulent transfer, since “each transaction was undertaken in an effort to
perpetuate a Ponzi scheme that inevitably collapsed and left hundreds of
unsophisticated Ohio investors holding the bag.”
This case demonstrates the importance of drafting transactional
documents carefully, even standard clauses. Most of the provisions that
demonstrated that the 2004 ARL&SA was a novation were standard
superseding, entire agreement, and consideration clauses. However, read in
context, they could be used in an argument to invalidate the interests granted
under the 2002 L&SA. Additionally, the 2004 ARL&SA contained no
continuing full force and effect clause, nor any clause indicating that the
document was not intended to serve as a novation. Transactional attorneys
should pay close attention to how these continuing agreements are read in
context and include full force and effect clauses in such documents. However,
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this case is also an example of fairness, as the court ruling that the agreement
was not a novation would allow Textron, a clearly guilty party, to have
substantial gains off of a Ponzi scheme with no consequences for their actions.
In conclusion, lawyers should not only be cautious of their drafting, but advise
clients of the ethical and legal implications of their wrongful activity.

LENDING & JURISDICTION
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York held that it had specific personal jurisdiction over a
foreign bank that purchased an interest in a term loan to the
debtor despite the bank’s very limited connections to the United
States. In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09-50026 (MG), 2017 WL
632126, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017).
Andrew Tucker
In In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09-50026 (MG), 2017 WL
632126, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017), the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed
whether it had specific personal jurisdiction over an Austrian bank that
purchased an interest in a term loan to the debtor. In passing on this
issue, the Bankruptcy Court considered language in the term loan
agreement, language in a prior order the Bankruptcy Court entered, and
the Austrian bank’s contacts with the United States. After construing
such language and applying specific personal jurisdiction principles, the
Bankruptcy Court held that it had specific personal jurisdiction over the
Austrian bank despite the Austrian bank not holding itself out as doing
business in the United States and it having no offices, employees, or
property in the United States.
This adversary proceeding arose within General Motors
Corporation’s (“GM”) Chapter 11 bankruptcy case and focused on a
particular loan that GM entered into before filing for bankruptcy. Back
in November 2006 and with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”)
acting as agent, GM obtained a $1.5 billion syndicated term loan (the
“Term Loan”).
In September 2007, the defendant immigon
portfolioabbau ag’s (“Immigon”) predecessor, Osterreichische
Volksbanken Aktiengesellschaft (“OEVAG”), purchased a $10 million
interest in the Term Loan from JPMorgan. At that time, OEVAG was
an Austrian bank domiciled in Vienna, Austria. OEVAG never had any
offices, employees, or property in the United States and never held itself
out as doing business in the United States. However, though OEVAG
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arranged the purchase from Austria, OEVAG did open and maintain a
correspondent bank account in New York City for the purchase
transaction.
When OEVAG purchased an interest in the Term Loan in
September 2007, it agreed to become a party to the Term Loan
agreement. The Term Loan agreement stated that parties to it
“irrevocably and unconditionally submit[ed] . . . to the . . . jurisdiction of
any New York . . . Federal court . . . in any action . . . relating to [the]
Agreement.” The Term Loan agreement also made clear that New York
law governed the agreement and OEVAG’s purchase transaction.
After GM filed for bankruptcy in June 2009, OEVAG
monitored the bankruptcy proceedings by maintaining contact with and
receiving notices from New York-based JPMorgan. In late June 2009,
JPMorgan apprised OEVAG that the Bankruptcy Court had approved a
debtor-in-possession loan order (“DIP Order”) and provided its terms
to OEVAG. The DIP Order granted OEVAG the right to repayment
of its interest in the Term Loan, subject to the creditors’ committee’s
right to investigate the lien’s validity. The DIP Order further stated that
any secured party “accepting Payment shall submit to the jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Court.” In late June 2009, JPMorgan paid OEVAG the
value of its Term Loan interest into the correspondent bank account
OEVAG maintained in New York. OEVAG accepted the payment
without objection.
In September 2009, plaintiff Motors Liquidation Company
Avoidance Action Trust (“AAT”) brought this adversarial proceeding to
clawback the funds previously paid to the Term Loan’s interest holders.
After officially being served with a summons in September 2016,
Immigon moved to have the adversarial proceedings dismissed against it
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Bankruptcy Court denied Immigon’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Court held that Immigon
consented to its jurisdiction and, alternatively, that specific personal
jurisdiction principles granted it jurisdiction over Immigon. The
Bankruptcy Court first noted that Immigon, as OEVAG’s successor,
stepped into OEVAG’s “jurisdictional shoes” such that OEVAG’s
conduct was attributable to it. With this understanding, the Bankruptcy
Court based its personal jurisdiction over Immigon on three alternative
grounds: (1) the Term Loan agreement’s language; (2) the DIP Order’s
language, and (3) specific personal jurisdiction principles.
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First, the Bankruptcy Court explained that, by the Term Loan
agreement’s explicit terms, OEVAG “expressly consented to the
application of New York law and to a New York forum.” The
Bankruptcy Court observed that parties resisting forum selection clauses
“must make a strong showing in order to overcome the presumption of
enforceability.” The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Immigon failed
to make such a strong showing because (1) it enjoyed “the benefits and
protection of New York law in connection with [the Term Loan]
Agreement” and (2) AAT’s alleged rights against Immigon flowed
directly from the Term Loan agreement that OEVAG received payment
under. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held that OEVAG consented
to its personal jurisdiction by virtue of the Term Loan agreement’s
language.
Second, the Bankruptcy Court noted that OEVAG also
consented to its jurisdiction under the DIP Order. The DIP Order
stated that AAT had the right to seek a clawback of the funds paid to the
Term Loan’s interest holders and that interest holders accepting
payments under the DIP Order consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s
jurisdiction in later disputes. The Bankruptcy Court placed importance
on OEVAG having notice of the DIP Order and its terms before it
accepted payment. Based on that reality, the Bankruptcy Court held that
“OEVAG knowingly consented to the jurisdictional consent provision
in the DIP Order by accepting the transfer of funds.”
Last, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that, even if OEVAG did
not consent to its jurisdiction, OEVAG had sufficient minimum
contacts with its jurisdiction to grant it specific personal jurisdiction over
OEVAG. The Bankruptcy Court stated that sufficient minimum
contacts exist “where the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled
into court there.” The Bankruptcy Court found such “purposeful
availment” based on OEVAG (1) purchasing interests in the Term Loan
from JPMorgan in New York, (2) agreeing that the transaction be
governed by New York law and consenting to New York federal courts’
jurisdiction, and (3) opening and maintaining a New York-based
correspondent bank account for the transaction into which JPMorgan
deposited the disputed payment.
Justifying its conclusion, the
Bankruptcy Court declared that, OEVAG “enjoyed the benefits of the
U.S. banking system and New York’s status as a financial capital” and
thus should be subject to its jurisdiction.
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The Bankruptcy Court found no Due Process concerns of “fair
play and substantial justice” to preclude its personal jurisdiction over
Immigon. The Bankruptcy Court noted it had a “strong interest in
adjudicating claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code,” that AAT had a
“strong interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” and that
the inconvenience to Immigon of defending in a foreign legal system
was not dispositive. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court denied
Immigon’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In re Motors Liquidation Co. shows that Bankruptcy Courts will
enforce jurisdictional consent clauses contained in loan agreements
against loan interest holders when the purchase makes them parties to
the agreement. Further, this case strongly implies that Bankruptcy
Courts apply specific personal jurisdiction concepts liberally. As such,
foreign entities similar to OEVAG that have no property located in the
United States or that never physically travel to the United States for
business purposes could still be subject to Bankruptcy Courts’ specific
personal jurisdiction. Such entities are especially susceptible to a specific
personal jurisdiction finding if they have a correspondent bank account
in the United States that has some relation to the issue in the bankruptcy
case.
To thwart foreign entities’ efforts to argue against personal
jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Courts, practitioners should draft clear
jurisdictional consent and waiver provisions in agreements with foreign
entities similar to those that led to the Court’s holding in this case. By
so drafting and given Bankruptcy Courts’ broad conception of specific
personal jurisdiction, practitioners can be confident that Bankruptcy
Courts will exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign entities, even if
they have little contact with the United States.

BANKRUPTCY & UCC
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia held that, under the West Virginia Uniform
Commercial Code and other applicable law, a secured creditor
may transfer equitable title in collateral before transferring legal
title, a transfer of equitable title in collateral constitutes a
“disposition,” and one day of notice before a disposition of
collateral is commercially unreasonable. Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v.
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Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Godfrey), 557 B.R. 469 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va.
2016).
Michael Petherick
In Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v. Huntington National Bank (In re
Godfrey), 557 B.R. 469 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2016), the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia addressed
several issues arising under Articles 2 and 9 of West Virginia’s Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) regarding a secured creditor’s transfer of
collateral. Specifically, the bankruptcy court decided: (1) whether a
secured creditor may transfer equitable title to collateral before
transferring legal title; (2) whether a transfer of equitable title in collateral
constitutes a “disposition” subject to the commercial reasonableness
standard of U.C.C. Article 9; and (3) whether one day’s notice of a
disposition of collateral is commercially unreasonable.
The circumstances that led to this case began in April 2010,
when Morgantown Excavators, Inc. (“MEI”) executed several
promissory notes to Huntington National Bank (“HNB”) and granted
HNB a security interest in its equipment and other items. Shirley
Godfrey (“Godfrey”) acted as a personal guarantor for those notes.
Eventually, MEI failed to make payments, and defaulted on the
notes and forbearance agreements that it entered with HNB. HNB then
entered into an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) with Myron Bowling
Auctioneers, Inc. (“Myron Bowling”) on February 27, 2012. The APA
provided that Myron Bowling would pay HNB $535,000 for the
collateral securing MEI’s notes, with 25% of the price due upon
execution of the APA and 75% once HNB removed the collateral and
provided title. It also provided that Myron Bowling would take
possession of the collateral by March 15, 2012.
Myron Bowling took possession of the collateral on March 5,
2012. On March 22, 2012, HNB sent MEI and Godfrey notice of a
private disposition, which stated that HNB would sell MEI’s collateral
after April 9, 2012. One day later, Myron Bowling paid HNB the full
$535,000 for the collateral. At some time before April 6, 2012, Myron
Bowling advertised a public auction of the collateral scheduled for April
20, 2012. Further, on April 18, 2012, HNB transferred a bill of sale for
the collateral to Myron Bowling and executed legal title in its favor.
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Finally, on April 20, 2012, Myron Bowling sold the collateral at the
advertised public auction.
MEI, Godfrey, and their Chapter 7 bankruptcy estates (the
“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against HNB and Myron Bowling on June
14, 2016 in the Bankruptcy Court. The Plaintiffs alleged that HNB and
Myron Bowling disposed of MEI’s collateral in violation of the U.C.C.
and other state law. After the Plaintiffs filed their complaint, HNB
moved for summary judgment on several issues related to the Plaintiffs’
claims. The Bankruptcy Court partially granted the motion and
dismissed Myron Bowling as a defendant in the action.
Shortly afterward, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
on the issue of HNB’s liability for disposing of the collateral in a
commercially unreasonable manner. The Plaintiffs argued that HNB’s
disposition of MEI’s collateral was commercially unreasonable because
HNB provided inadequate notice. More specifically, the Plaintiffs
argued that, because equitable title to the collateral passed to Myron
Bowling when it became entitled to legal title on March 23, 2012, HNB
disposed of the collateral as of March 23, 2012, and therefore provided
notice only one day before the disposition occurred. HNB, on the other
hand, argued that construing the APA to facilitate a transfer of equitable
title frustrated the intent of the parties, that equitable title transferred
only with legal title, and that, even if HNB transferred equitable title to
Myron Bowling, the transfer failed to constitute a disposition subject to
the commercial reasonableness standard of U.C.C. Article 9.
The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Plaintiffs after determining three issues: (1) Whether Myron Bowling
acquired equitable title to the collateral as of March 23, 2012; (2) whether
a transfer of equitable title constituted a “disposition” under U.C.C.
Article 9; and (3) whether HNB’s notice was commercially unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-401(2), as adopted in West Virginia Code § 46-2401(2), provides that, unless otherwise provided for by agreement, legal
title to goods transfers upon delivery. Further, U.C.C. § 2-401(1)
provides that retention of legal title in goods after delivery creates a
property interest for the party that retains legal title. Under West
Virginia common law, a person who lacks legal title, but obtained
property rights that allow that person to enjoy the benefits of ownership,
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has obtained equitable title. Further, U.C.C. §§ 9-610, 9-611, and 9-612,
as adopted in West Virginia Code §§ 46-9-610, 46-9-611, and 46-9-612,
provide that dispositions of collateral must be commercially reasonable,
and that secured creditors must provide reasonable notice of
dispositions. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-612 also indicates that
reasonable notice sent to a debtor must be timely and allow the debtor
to act on the notice. Moreover, although the U.C.C. fails to define
“disposition,” courts, like the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Regency Financial Corp., 309 F.3d 1045, 1049
(8th Cir. 2002), hold that a transfer of an equitable interest is a
“disposition.”
The bankruptcy court first held that HNB transferred equitable
title to Myron Bowling as of March 23, 2012. The bankruptcy court
stated first that, because the APA provided that legal title transferred to
Myron Bowling upon payment of the full purchase price, it altered the
general rule, in U.C.C. § 2-401(2), that legal title to goods transfers with
delivery. Although HNB failed to transfer legal title to Myron Bowling
when it paid the full purchase price on March 23, 2012, the bankruptcy
court noted that an equitable interest transferred to Myron Bowling at
that time. Further, West Virginia common law supported the idea that
equitable title passed to Myron Bowling as of March 23, 2012 because
Myron Bowling marketed the property shortly afterward, thereby
showing that it enjoyed the benefits of ownership at that time.
Moreover, West Virginia law provided Myron Bowling with the right to
equitable enforcement of the APA because it performed its APA
obligations as of March 23, 2012. Finally, the Bankruptcy Court denied
HNB’s argument that its findings circumvented the intent of the parties
because nothing in the APA indicated that the parties intended to halt
the effect of applicable law or prevent liability for violations of the
U.C.C.
Second, the bankruptcy court held that HNB’s transfer of
equitable title to Myron Bowling constituted a disposition subject to the
commercial reasonableness standard of U.C.C. Article 9. Specifically,
the bankruptcy court adopted the reasoning of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Williams, where it held that a
“disposition” is merely a permanent transfer of property. Because the
APA facilitated the permanent transfer of an interest in MEI’s collateral,
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the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that transferring equitable title
constituted a disposition.
Third, the bankruptcy court held that HNB provided
unreasonable notice of the disposition and therefore violated U.C.C. § 9610’s commercial reasonableness standard. Specifically, because HNB
sent notice only one day before it actually disposed of MEI’s collateral,
that notice violated U.C.C. §§ 9-611 and 9-612. Further, the bankruptcy
court noted that HNB’s notice was insufficient because it stated that the
disposition of the collateral would occur no earlier than April 9, 2012,
and the disposition actually occurred on or before March 23, 2012.
In light of this case commercial and bankruptcy lawyers should
note that courts may find that a transfer of equitable title in collateral
takes place even though no transfer of legal title occurs. Further, a court
may find such a transfer to be a disposition subject to the commercial
reasonableness standard of U.C.C. Article 9.

PROMISSORY NOTES & SECURITIES
A California Court of Appeal determined that a promissory note
did not constitute a security because it was an individually
negotiated, one-on-one transaction with a repayment option that
was not contingent on the success of the investment. People v. Black,
214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Evan Sharber
In People v. Black, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), the
Court of Appeal of California addressed whether a promissory note
constituted a “security” under the California Corporate Securities Law of
1968. The California statute, modeled after the Securities Act of 1933
(“1933 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77b, criminalizes “the sale or purchase of
securities by means of oral or written communications which either
contain false or misleading statements or omit material facts.” Cal.
Corp. Code § 25401. In the context of a defendant’s motion to dismiss
criminal charges, the Court of Appeal considered whether a promissory
note constituted a security within the meaning of the federal test
established in S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), because, in
California, a transaction is a security if it satisfies the Howey test or the
California’s narrower risk-capital test. The Court of Appeal concluded
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that the promissory note was not a security under the Howey test because
it was an individually negotiated, one-on-one transaction with a
repayment option that was not contingent on the success of the
investment.
The case arose when, in early 2006, the defendant Charles Black
persuaded an acquaintance, Bronic Knarr, to invest in a development
opportunity in Idaho. Knarr gave Black $124,456 for procuring two
residential pieces of the proposed project.
The accompanying
promissory note documented Black’s promise to pay $124,456 to Knarr
along with interest. The note defined three alternative forms of interest
depending on the outcome of the development. First, if Black sold the
two residential properties, Knarr would receive a percentage of the
profits. Second, if the full development materialized, Knarr would
receive a portion of the property. Finally, if the property was neither
sold nor developed within a year, Black would owe the principal together
with interest at a rate of 10%. The note also bound Black’s personal
property as collateral. Over time, Black and Knarr signed multiple
amendments to the note, reflecting Knarr’s increased principal
investment to $279,920 and extension of the maturity date to January
2012. By April 2012, Knarr was suffering from health problems and no
longer had the patience to continue waiting. He called the loan but
received no response from Black. After an investigation into Black, a
detective found that Black’s LLC was not registered in California, that
the owner of the proposed development property in Idaho had not
heard from Black in four years, and that the balance in Black’s accounts
did not contain sufficient funds to repay the amount of money owed to
Knarr. Additionally, outgoing payments from Black’s account showed
the funds had been used mostly for personal purposes.
In August 2013, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a
complaint against Black, alleging, among other things, that he violated
California Corporate Code § 25401. Weighing in on Black’s motion to
dismiss, the trial court concluded in two of the counts that the note and
amendments were not securities under the state-based or Howey tests.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision.
In providing the legal framework of the case, the Court of
Appeal noted that the California statute was modeled after the 1933 Act,
which includes in its definitional section the words “[w]hen used in this
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subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires—(1) [t]he term "security"
means any note, stock, treasury stock . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77b. (emphasis
added). The California statute contains similar contextual language. Cal.
Corp. Code §§ 25001, 25019. As such, the Court of Appeal indicated
that the list of instruments deemed to be securities is not applied literally,
citing People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1986). This is in keeping with
the Howey test’s emphasis on form over substance, as well as with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982),
to impose some limits on the broad definition of a security.
After quickly determining that the promissory note did not
qualify as a security under the California-specific test, the Court of
Appeal turned to the Howey test. Under the Howey test, the question is
“whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Further, “a common enterprise” can be shown
in a profit-sharing arrangement—such as those envisioned by two of the
three repayment alternatives with the promissory note in the Black case.
However, the Court of Appeal found that the inclusion of the third
option—repayment of the principal investment together with 10%
interest—along with the provision binding Black’s separate property to
ensure repayment, created a possibility of redress for Knarr. This
possibility of redress pushed the situation beyond the scope of the
regulatory purpose of the securities laws. In effect, because Knarr had a
right to be paid whether the business prospered or not, the Court of
Appeal held that the note could not be a security.
The Court of Appeal likened the situation in Black to the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Marine Bank, a civil antifraud action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Marine Bank, the Weaver family
bought a certificate of deposit and pledged it to Marine Bank as
collateral for a loan to a company owned by the Piccirillo family in
exchange for 50% of the profits in the company moving forward.
Under the agreement, the Weavers also received rights to use the
Piccirillos’ property and to veto future borrowing by the company.
When the scheme took a turn for the worse, the Weavers sued Marine
Bank for failing to disclose the Piccirillos’ financial troubles. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that an agreement between the two families did not
constitute a security, emphasizing that there are limits to the broad
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definition of a security. The Court explained that the Weavers had a
degree of control beyond an amount present in a typical security because
of the Weavers’ veto power. Further, the fact that no prospectus was
provided and that the agreement was unique and not designed to be
traded publicly also weighed against finding that the agreement was a
security.
The Court of Appeal highlighted several features of the
promissory note in Black that were like the agreement in Marine Bank.
The investment was individually negotiated and a one-on-one
transaction. Knarr had travelled with Black to Idaho to look at the
property. Black did not offer Knarr a prospectus, nor was there any
possibility that the agreement could have been traded publicly. Most
importantly, the promissory note contained the right to be paid
regardless of the success of the development.
The Court of Appeal concluded that this decision was “not . . . a
finding that all one-on-one contracts are excluded as a matter of law
from the definition of a security.” Instead, the “individualized nature of
the transaction is one factor that must be considered in determining
whether a transaction comes within the regulatory purpose and purview
of the securities laws.”
The Black decision could serve as persuasive authority in
Tennessee in situations where a one-on-one promissory note contains a
repayment option that is not contingent on the success of the
investment. In State v. Burrow, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
noted the influence of “cases from other jurisdictions, both state and
federal [in] . . . interpreting various statutory definitions of the term
‘security.’” State v. Burrow, 769 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1989). Like the 1933 Act, the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980 includes
“unless the context otherwise requires” prior to the listing instruments
included in the definition of a security. Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-1-102.
Perhaps there is room for a similar expansion in Tennessee of the
contextual limitations on the term “security.”

INSURANCE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that an Uninsured Motorist
Policy covered an accident caused by the operator of rental car
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when the rental company was self-insured yet exempt from
liability. Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2016).
Rebekah Pritchard
In Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2016), the Tennessee
Supreme Court addressed whether a rental car was an uninsured motor
vehicle under the terms of Edward Martin’s (“Martin”) insurance policy
(the “Policy”). The court employed concepts of statutory and contract
interpretation to clarify the vague and ambiguous language of Martin’s
Policy. In interpreting the language of the Policy, the court looked to
the parties’ intent by using the plain and ordinary meaning of the Policy’s
terms. Further, the court construed ambiguous provisions in favor of
the insured—an additional rule applicable to insurance contracts.
This case arose out of an alcohol-induced altercation on July 20,
2012, where Gregory Powers (“Powers”) struck Martin in the knee with
a vehicle rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (“Enterprise”). Powers did
not purchase the optional insurance coverage offered by Enterprise
when he rented the vehicle. Additionally, Powers’ primary insurer was
not liable for harm resulting from the incident because Powers’ actions
were intentional. Therefore, Martin sought recovery under his Policy
with IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (“IDS”).
Martin’s Policy stated that IDS would pay for compensatory
damages if the policy holder is entitled to recovery from the operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle. The Policy excluded from the definition of
“uninsured motor vehicle” any vehicle “owned or operated by a selfinsurer under any applicable motor vehicle law . . . .” Thus, the court
had to determine whether the Enterprise rental car was a vehicle that
was owned or operated by a self-insured insurer under any applicable
motor vehicle law. IDS argued that under the Tennessee Financial
Responsibility Law (the “FR Law”), Enterprise is a self-insurer;
therefore, the car was not an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the
Policy.
The trial court granted IDS’ motion for summary judgment.
Martin appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Tennessee
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Power’s rental car
was an uninsured motor vehicle and thus, covered by the Policy.
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Because the Policy provided an exception for vehicles owned or
operated by a self-insurer but did not define the term, the court first
looked to the generally accepted meaning of the term. The ordinary
meaning of a self-insurer is an entity or individual who assumes the risk
of covering liability through their own assets and does not purchase
insurance through an insurance company. An entity becomes a selfinsurer by evidencing its ability to pay the amount for which it may
become liable; most often this is done by filing a bond. Additionally,
because the Policy did not define the term self-insurer, the court
considered the intent of the policy, which was to provide recovery when
the responsible party was no longer able to do so.
In concluding that the vehicle at issue was an uninsured motor
vehicle under the Policy, the court first looked to the Tennessee
Uninsured Motorist Act (the “UM Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-71201 to -1206 (2016). The purpose of the UM Act was to assure an
innocent insured party recourse when he or she is injured by a person
who is not in the position to pay damages, making the insurance carrier
responsible for the uninsured motorist. Further, the UM Act excludes
self-insured motor vehicles as defined in the FR Law or any other state
or federal law from the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle.” See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1202(a)(2)(C) (2016). Under the FR Law, the
Tennessee Commissioner of Safety (the “Commissioner”) may issue a
certificate of self-insurance if the Commissioner is satisfied that the
company has the ability to pay judgements decreed against it. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 55-12-111 (2012). However, under the federal Graves
Amendment, states may not impose vicarious liability on vehicle rental
companies for actions taken by their customers. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106
(2012). Because a self-insurer would not insure a risk for which it would
not be liable under federal law, it could not be a self-insurer with respect
to risks arising from customers’ conduct. Further, the FR Law expressly
exempts any requirement for rental car companies to show proof of the
ability to pay judgments issued against its customers. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 55-12-106(10) (Supp. 2016). Therefore, the court held that
Enterprise did not qualify as a self-insurer with respect to accidents
caused by customers.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Martin v. Powers
indicates that judicial construction of insurance policies will strongly

2017]

CASE COMMENTARIES

1089

disfavor insurance companies. Without specific definition of terms and
governing law, the court will now supplement these policies in a manner
which favors the insured. The court’s decision may also lead to a
varying application of the law from state to state. In light of this
decision, insurance companies should revise their policies to clarify any
vague or ambiguous references. Additionally, the Tennessee legislature
should review the UM Act and FR Law to clarify whether a vehicle can
be considered “insured” if owned by a self-insurer, even though the
owner/self-insurer cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the
operator.

COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
Under Tennessee Law, courts will hold a tenant personally liable
for back rent resulting from a business’s nonpayment for
commercial lease, which was signed by the tenant in a
representative capacity and also as a personal guarantor for the
lease agreement. MLG Enters., LLC v. Johnson, 507 S.W.3d 183 (Tenn.
2016).
Chanse Hayes
In MLG Enters., LLC v. Johnson, 507 S.W.3d 183 (Tenn. 2016),
the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that a company’s individual
representative could be held personally liable for the terms of a
commercial lease agreement. The court construed the lease’s plain
language to determine that the parties’ intent was to also impose
individual liability, in the case of default or breach, upon the defendant
Richard Johnson (“Johnson”). The court then determined that the lease
as a whole and the Defendant’s conduct in signing the lease twice
established the clear intent necessary to bind Johnson in an individual
capacity.
The landlord, MLG Enterprises, LLC (“MLG”) entered a lease
agreement with the tenant, Mobile Master Manufacturing, LLC (“Mobile
Master”), for a commercial property. Johnson, in his capacity as
president and owner of Mobile Master, executed the commercial lease
agreement with MLG on October 1, 2007. Paragraph 37 of the lease
agreement titled “Personal Liability” explicitly stated: “In consideration
of Landlord entering into this Lease with the Tenant, Richard L.
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Johnson hereby agrees that he shall be personally liable for all of
Tenant’s obligations under this Lease and executes this Lease for that
purpose.” The signature block of the contract followed directly after the
personal liability provision and included three separate sections for
signatures: one for MLG, the second for Mobile Master, and a third for
Johnson. The three parties signed and executed the lease agreement.
The final signature block contained the following words handwritten by
Johnson: “Richard L. Johnson for Mobile Master Mfg. LLC.”
In October 2008, Mobile Master stopped paying rent. In a
subsequent lawsuit by MLG seeking to hold Johnson personally liable
for the unpaid rent, Johnson denied personal liability, arguing that both
of his signatures were made in his representative capacity as CEO of
Mobile Master. The case was tried in September 2013 without a jury,
and the trial court granted Johnson’s motion for an involuntary
dismissal. In June 2014, the trial court issued a final order rejecting
MLG’s claim against Johnson and issuing a judgment in favor of MLG
against Mobile Master for the unpaid rent. MLG appealed this decision,
which was then affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals before the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed these decisions.
The trial court determined that Johnson had “clearly expressed
his intent to sign in a representative capacity” by including the additional
words “for Mobile Master Mfg. L.L.C.” next to his signature. As such,
the trial court determined that these words evoked a rebuttable
presumption that that Mr. Johnson’s second signature was also made in
a representative capacity. The trial court also relied on the fact that the
lease agreement did not contain the term “guarantor” to find that
Johnson’s second signature did not create any personal liability under the
lease.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. In
affirming the trial court’s dismissal, the appellate court relied upon the
holdings in Cone Oil Co. v. Green, 669 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)
(analyzing the presumptive effect of the words “by” and “for”) and 84
Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
personal liability when then provision was distinct from other provisions
within the contract because the personal liability provision was in capital
letters). The Court of Appeals agreed that Johnson’s second signature
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was also entitled to the “representative capacity” presumption and that
MLG did not provide evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption.
In reversing the lower courts, the Tennessee Supreme Court
determined that Mr. Johnson’s second signature was sufficient to “bind
him individually as a guarantor.” The court distinguished 84 Lumber Co.
from the present case because of the explicit, unambiguous language in
the lease agreement. Crucially, the Court reasoned that holding otherwise
would yield no purpose or effect to the second signature. The court
found that the second signature following a contract paragraph titled
“Personal Liability” effectively resulted in Johnson’s personal
responsibility for Mobile Master’s obligations.
Practitioners should employ the contract drafting critiques
alluded to in this decision relative to their particular client: the lessor or
the lessee. For lessors of commercial real estate, attorneys should draft
lease agreements with a signature block for the representative and a
signature block for the guarantor. In addition, the problems resolved in
this case could be avoided by adding the language “personally
guaranteed by” prior to the second signature along with a personal
liability provision within the body of the lease agreement. This may
prove vital for the lessor if the tenant is a small start-up or new
enterprise with limited financial resources to deploy in case of default.
For the tenant in commercial lease agreement, attorneys should advise
their client of the potential repercussions of personally guaranteeing the
leasing entity’s obligations under the lease. Attorneys who use these
techniques can mitigate the risk inherent within commercial leasing
arrangements and reduce future litigation.

SECURITIES
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a jury can infer
that a tipper is personally benefited when he or she makes a gift of
confidential corporate information to a trading relative or friend.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
Lauren Safley
In Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the United States
Supreme Court addressed insider trading liability for the recipient of
inside corporate information (a “tippee”). Section 10(b) of the Securities
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Exchange Act of 1934 and related regulations “prohibit undisclosed
trading on inside corporate information by persons bound under a duty
of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such
information for their personal advantage.” The tippee acquires the
tipper’s duty to abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information
was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty. A tipper breaches
his fiduciary duty when a disclosure of inside information results in a
personal benefit. In Salman, the Supreme Court followed its own
precedent by holding that a jury may infer a personal benefit to a tipper
when he or she makes a gift of confidential corporate information to
trading relative or friend.
The facts of Salman involved three individuals. Maher Kara, an
investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group,
who personally dealt with confidential information regarding mergers
and acquisitions involving many of the company’s clients, began
disclosing inside information to his older brother Mounir (Michael)
Kara. Initially, Maher took on a passive role in disclosing inside
information to Michael, but eventually took on a more active role by
assisting Michael’s trading “by sharing inside information with his
brother about pending mergers and acquisitions.” Without Maher’s
knowledge, Michael began to disclose the inside information received
from Maher to his brother-in-law Salman. Using this inside information,
Salman was able to accumulate more than $1.5 million in profits, which
he would split with another relative who “executed trades via a
brokerage account on Salman’s behalf,” before the authorities noticed.
Thus, Salman’s insider trading liability depended on whether Maher
received a personal benefit from Michael.
In the Northern District of California, Salman was convicted on
one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and four counts of
securities fraud, resulting in 36 months of imprisonment, three years of
supervised release, and over $730,000 in restitution. Salman appealed his
conviction to the Ninth Circuit, and while his appeal was pending, the
Second Circuit rendered its opinion in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d
438 (2014), a case which spoke on the issue of factfinders inferring a
“personal benefit to the tipper from a gift on confidential information to
a trading relative or friend.” In Newman, there was no evidence that the
defendants had knowledge of the source of the inside information, nor
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were the defendants close to corporate insiders. Therefore, the Second
Circuit departed from Dirks and concluded that an inference “is
impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential,
and represents at least a potential gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature.”
Using Newman as support, Salman argued on appeal that there
was no evidence that Maher “received anything of a pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature” in exchange for inside information. The Ninth
Circuit disagreed and reaffirmed Salman’s conviction, declining to follow
the Newman decision, which required “additional gain to the tipper in
cases involving gifts of confidential information to family and friends,”
and holding that under the Dirks decision Maher benefited personally
because, Maher’s disclosures to Michael were “‘precisely the gift of
confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.”
On certiorari, the Supreme Court explained that under Dirks, a
tippee will be liable for trading on inside information if the tippee
“participates in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty.” Further, they
explained that the test for determining whether the tippee participated in
this breach, “is whether the insiders personally benefited, directly or
indirectly, from the disclosure.” Dirks stated that this “personal benefit”
can often be inferred by looking at “objective facts and circumstances,”
which included a close relationship between the tipper and tipee.
Specifically, the Court held in Dirks, that in situations where a tipper
reveals confidential information to a trading relative, “the tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the
recipient.” Ultimately, the Court held that when a tipper discloses
confidential information to a trading friend or relative, “the jury can
infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift.”
Applying Dirks to the case at hand, the Court held that when Maher
disclosed the confidential information to Michael, who then disclosed
the information to Salman, Maher breached his fiduciary duty of trust,
which Michael, and subsequently Salman, acquired and breached when
they traded on the information. Therefore, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, concluding that to the extent
Newman required that the tipper “receive something of pecuniary or
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similarly valuable nature” in exchange for the confidential information to
a trading relative, is inconsistent with Dirks.
Ultimately, the holding in Salman reinforced the Dirks holding,
which allows for a jury to infer that a tipper is personally benefited when
they disclose confidential corporate information to a trading relative or
friend. Both Salman and Dirks provide a generous inference to attorneys
who prosecute insider trading cases. No longer must prosecutors
respond to arguments that a personal benefit must be explicitly proven.
Instead, the jury can infer the personal benefit to the tipper, eliminating
an obstacle for the prosecution.

PATENTS
The term “article of manufacture” is broad and encompasses both
the product sold to a consumer as well as the component(s) of that
product, regardless of whether the product or its components are
sold separately. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
Kevin McNelis
In Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had affirmed a jury
award to Apple of $399 million in damages for Samsung’s design patent
infringement. The Supreme Court found the Federal Circuit’s reading of
the Section 289 of the Patent Act – specifically the term “article of
manufacture” – too narrow. In doing so, the Court resolved the
question of whether, “in the case of a multicomponent product,” the
article of manufacture must be the “end product sold to the consumer
or whether it can also be a component of that product.” The Court
answered with the latter, holding that the term “article of manufacture”
is broad enough to encompass both the end product as well as that
product’s components.
This case arose out of a 2011 lawsuit in which Apple sued
Samsung, alleging that it had infringed several of Apple’s design patents.
A jury agreed, and Apple was awarded $399 million in damages for the
infringement, which the Federal Circuit affirmed. This sum represented
the total profit Samsung had received from its infringement; quoting
Section 289 of the Patent Act, the Court noted that an infringer is liable
for “all of the profit made . . . from the manufacture or sale of the
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‘article of manufacture to which [the patented] design or colorable
imitation has been applied.’”
To begin its analysis, the Court addressed the process by which
Section 289 damages are determined. The process involves two steps: 1)
identifying the “‘article of manufacture’ to which the infringed design
has been applied” and 2) “calculat[ing] the infringer’s total profit made
on that article of manufacture.” The Court’s decision hinged entirely on
the term “article of manufacture.” Did the term apply solely to the end
product, as the Federal Circuit had held when it rejected Samsung’s
argument because the infringed components had not been sold
separately but rather with the entire phone? Or could it also apply to the
end product, the components of that end product, or both?
Quoting a dictionary from the late 1800s, the Court noted that
the term “article” is simply “‘a particular thing.’” From such a simple
definition, the Court then reasoned that an article of manufacture is
simply “a thing made by hand or machine.” Such a broad description, in
turn, led to the reasoning that the term encompassed “both a product
sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product.” Samsung
believed that the damage award “should have been limited to the
infringing ‘article[s] of manufacture,’” essentially arguing that, in the
entire makeup of its smartphones, only a few component parts of many
had imitated those of Apple’s. The Federal Circuit rejected this
contention because Samsung had not sold the infringing component
parts and the non-infringing component parts separately – because there
was no distinction, there was no need to limit the damage award. The
Supreme Court, however, agreed with Samsung’s reasoning, holding that
just because a component part has been integrated into a larger product
“does not put it outside the category of articles of manufacture.”
The Court supported its reading of the text of Section 289 by
comparing it to other sections within the same title. Section 171(a) of
the Patent Act provides that “any new, original and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture” may be protected under patent law if the
proper steps are taken prescribed in the statute. The Court noted that
the Patent Office, as well as other courts, have historically interpreted
Section 171 as “extending to only a component of a multicomponent
product.” Similarly, Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any
new and useful . . . manufacture . . .may obtain a patent.” Here, the
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Court noted that the term “manufacture” is broad and includes all the
component parts of the machine separately from the machine as a
whole.
Patent attorneys will take note of this case for several reasons.
One effect that the Court’s decision may have is a decrease in monetary
damages awarded for patent infringement of multicomponent products.
The Court declined to decide the issue regarding the calculation of the
$399 million sum initially awarded to Apple; but there is a possibility,
depending upon the Federal Circuit’s decision, that Samsung will pay
less – perhaps significantly less – than $399 million. If the Federal
Circuit rules in favor of Samsung, it may set a precedent for lower
monetary damages for the infringement of component parts of a
multicomponent product. The $399 million sum initially awarded to
Apple represented the total profit Samsung had made from its product
containing just a handful of infringed component parts.
Also of significance is the possible, yet unlikely, lack of incentive
the decision provides regarding companies’ efforts to work around
existing patent protections. Our society is growing increasingly
technological, and technological products by their very nature are
multicomponent products. Companies like Apple go through extreme
efforts to protect their products – as well as the components making up
those products. These efforts, combined with the advancements in
technology, may one day make it unduly difficult for a company to
design around another company’s patent protections. A damage award
for Apple that is too low may serve as a disincentive for companies to
engage in such designing efforts.

